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A Module for Media Intervention: Content 
Regulation in Post-Conflict Zones 
Peter Krug and Monroe E. Price 
Introduction 
In the late 1990s, an institutional structure - an 'architecture of media law' -
emerged in post-conflict zones for the temporary generation and application of 
norms regulating mass media content during the transition from international 
to domestic governance. 1 The creation of this system for post-conflict in-
formation intervention, which we will call a 'module' to illustrate its incipient 
nature, was predicated on the belief that a self-contained set of formal rules and 
procedures - a system of law - is necessary in the absence of an operating 
domestic legal regime in order to respond adequately to purportedly abusive 
media content and at the same time to provide safeguards protecting the 
exercise of expressive rights recognized under international standards. 2,3 
The module first appeared with the establishment of the Independent Media 
Commission (IMC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998. 4 It was borrowed by 
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and has undergone refine-
ment since the establishment in Kosovo of the office of the Temporary Media 
Commissioner (TMC) in June 2000. 5 In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, it is being phased out, to give way to yet another new structure in an 
interim system of governance more closely tied to local institutions and 
personnel. 6 
It is likely that the module will be considered for use in future post-conflict 
settings, as well as exerting some influence on the further development of media 
regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo~ this chapter, we examine 
aspects of the module's structure, normative base, and process, and seek to 
identify its implications for development of a law of information intervention if 
indeed it is gaining traction as a portable 'fix' for employment in the increasing 
number of transitory post-conflict environments. Because it represents a 
refinement of the module, we will focus on the Kosovo (UNMIK) system 
while making references to its predecessor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do not 
claim to have many complete answers; instead, we merely hope to raise useful 
questions and to suggest perspectives from which to judge whether the module's 
components are consistent with applicable international standards. 
A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION 
Constructing the Module 
The Module in a Constitutional Order 
!he module is a component of those systems of civil governance established b 
. 1 .. 8 Y 
I~ternatlOna orgamzatlOns in post-conflict zones. It operates as an interna-
tIOnal system imposed on a post-conflict territory in the absence of a function-
. d . 1 9 
mg omestic egal system. Because it serves equivalent purposes, we seek to 
assess the module the way we would a domestic system of media content 
regulation, starting with its constitutional foundations and then analyzing its 
st~u~ture, rules, and procedures. It must be seen not in isolation, but instead 
withm a larger constitutional order that presents an institutional structure and a 
set of fundamental norms with which all governing acts -legislative executive 
and judicial - must comply. ' , 
In Kosovo, the basic document for the UNMIK administration is Security 
Council Resolution 1244, enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN 
Char:er.
lO 
In ~ection 6, Resolution 1244 authorized the secretary-general to 
appomt a SpecIal Representative (the SRSG) to control the implementation of 
the international civil presence in Kosovo. In turn, the SRSG ordered th 
bl· h . 11 e esta IS ment of the TMC m June 2000. The nature of this structure means 
that the module is part of a chain of delegation and supervisory responsibility 
th~t extends back from the TMC to the SRSG, the UN secretary-general, and 
ultImately to the UN Security Council. 12 
In addition to structure, an essential component of the UNMIK constitu-
ti?n~l orde~ is. th~ fo~mal rec?gnition of fundamental norms that are legally 
bmdmg on ItS mstItutlOns. UltImately, the basis for these lies in Articles 55 and 
~6 of t~e United Nations Charter and in recognition of the principle that 
mt~rnatlOnal organizations are bound to observe human rights norms. Mean-
wh~le, :hese general principles have received greater specificity via the SRSG's 
legIslatIve enactments in UNMIK Regulations 1999/1 and 1999/24. UNMIK 
Regulation 1999/1, Section 2 ('Observance of internationally recognized 
standards'), states in full: 
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or 
holding ~ublic office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized 
human nghts standards and shall not discriminate against any person on 
an~ ~round ~uch as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other 
opmlOn, natIOnal, ethnic or social origin, association with a national 
community, property, birth or other status. 13 
Regulation 1999/24, Section l.3, is even more specific, stating that: 
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or 
holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized 
human rights standards, as reflected in particular in: The European 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Protocols thereto; The Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and 
the Protocols thereto; ... [and] The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965. 
Of this list, the European Convention is particularly noteworthy, both for the 
fact that it is the only regional instrument included and the fact that, at least in 
the field of mass media law, the media regulatory authorities in Kosovo have 
identified Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and, along with it, the Article 10 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as the basis 
. h f h . .. 14 15,16 for definmg t e parameters 0 t e1r activity. ' 
We also make an assumption that is important for our analysis: that the 
UNMIK institutions are bound by certain general principles of law that have 
been recognized by domestic legal systems and supranational and international 
organizations. 17 Of these, we are particularly concerned with separation of 
powers principles, such as the independence of prosecutors from the legislative 
and executive branches and provision of independent review of executive and 
prosecutorial acts. 
The Module as a Self-Contained System of Governance 
The module is a self-contained, law-based international regulatory system 
separate from any domestic legal regime, with a legislator promulgating 
generally applicable binding norms, a standing authority empowered to 
prosecute perceived violations of those norms, and control mechanisms 
designed to supervise the prosecutor's acts. 
The norms applicable to the mass media are generated from within this 
structure rather than from an outside source. In Kosovo, this legislative 
function is performed by the SRSG, who issues generally-applicable normative 
. dd" r' . f . 1819 Th d I ' t' I acts m a ltlon to penormmg executlve unctlOns.' e mo u e s essen la 
nature is defined by its core institution: a multi-dimensional agency that 
monitors the media, performs administrative functions such as the granting 
of broadcast licences, and acts as the prosecutor for imposition of sanctions for 
violations of the normative base. We will call this agency, which in Kosovo has 
been the Temporary Media Commissioner and in Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
Director-General, the 'Regulator'. (Before March 2001, when the IMC was 
merged with the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency to form the Com-
munications Regulatory Agency, the IMC was headed by a 'Director-General'. 
The focus of our study is the IMC and the TRA before the merger.) 
In Kosovo, the core of the Regulator's prosecutorial duties is found in the 
SRSG's authorization to the TMC to monitor media content and fashion 
remedies, including the imposition of sanctions, if the normative base is 
breached. 2o For example, as to print media, UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, 
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Secti~n 2, autho:izes the ~MC to impos~ one or more of the fOllowing 
sanctlOns: a warnmg; a reqUIrement to pubhsh a reply, correction or apology' 
a fi~e of not less tha~ DM 1,00? and not exceeding DM 100,000; seizure of 
eqUIpment and/or pnnted matenal; or suspension or closure of operations. 21 
The module's framers also have developed institutions for control of the 
Regulator's acts. In Kosovo, for example, the TMC cannot impose sanctions 
on the media without a finding by a three-member Media Hearings Board 
(MHB) that the normative base has been violated. 22 Also, the Kosovo and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina systems both provide for appellate review of sanction-
ing decisions. In Kosovo, the three-member Media Appeals Board (MAB) is 
empowered to uphold, modify, or rescind any TMC sanctioning decision. 23,24 
In all, the structural elements of the module suggest that attention has been paid 
to concerns about provision of safeguards against unconstrained, arbitrary acts by 
the prosecutorial authorities. However, further assessment of the effectiveness of 
the system in this regard, including the crucial question of the independence of the 
control mechanisms, requires evaluation of the normative base and the practical 
implementation of the module, to which we now turn. 
Normative Base 
The module is predicated on the conclusion that some form of content 
supervision and regulation is necessary in post-conflict zones and further 
that such action will be effective only if there is in place a body of'generall; 
applicable norms: that is, a formal system of law rather than an ad hoc 
approach. This conclusion reflects adherence to the general principle that 
prosecution can be based on no grounds other than those rules published and in 
existence at the time of the offence. 25 
In the module, it is accepted that the normative base is temporary (although 
indefinite) pending return to domestic rule. While in force, however, the rules 
of the normative base represent the sum total of the Regulator's enforcement 
mandate. The temporariness of the rules may be of only cosmetic interest when 
it comes to the legality of the norms. Unconscionable rules, for example, could 
not be justified because of their short-lived nature. 
With the exception of laws in effect in Kosovo in 1989, the normative base 
comprises solely SRSG Regulations and supplementary acts in the form of 
Codes of Conduct, drafted by the TMC and promulgated as binding law by the 
SRSG, for the print and broadcast media. 26,27 The centrepiece of this 
normative base is found in provisions of SRSG Regulations 2000/36 and 
2000/37, promulgated by the SRSG on 17 June, 2000. Because of the central 
place it has occupied in the TMC's prosecutorial activity, a key provision is 
Section 4.1 of SRSG Regulation 2000/37, which states in full: 
Owners, operators, publishers and editors shall refrain from publishing 
personal details of any person, including name, address or place of work, if 
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the publication of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety 
or security of any such person through vigilante violence or otherwise. 
SRSG Regulation 2000/36, Section 5.1, applies exactly the same prohibition to 
'Radio and Television Operators'. Another element in the normative base is the 
earlier SRSG Regulation 2000/4, 'On the Prohibition against Inciting to 
National Racial Religious or Ethnic Hatred, Discord, or Intolerance' pro-
mulgated on I February 2000 [the 'Hate Speech Regulation']' 
The Codes of Conduct present more detailed rules. For purposes of 
examining the regulatory scheme in Kosovo, we focus on the Code of Conduct 
for the print media, since it is the instrument that has been applied most often 
in the TMC's prosecutorial practice. The Code's rules governing content and 
editorial practice are found in the following provisions: 
Section 2 (Provocative Statements) 
2.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material 
that encourages crime or criminal activities or which carries imminent 
risk of causing harm, such harm being defined as death, or injury, or 
damage to property or other violence. 
2.2. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material 
that denigrates an ethnic or religious group or implies that an ethnic or 
religious group is responsible for criminal activity. 
Section 3 (Privacy) 
3.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material, 
that by intent or effect attributes criminal responsibility to any individual 
prior to a finding of guilt by a lawfully constituted tribunal. 
3.2. Publishers will protect the identity of, and will not reveal the names, 
description, photograph, the likeness of, or specific information about 
any individual alleged to have committed a crime, unless authorities 
responsible for the administration of justice have expressly authorized the 
publication of such information, or unless the individual has been found 
guilty of the crime by a lawfully constituted tribunal. 
Section 5 (Separation of News and Opinion) 
Publishers, while free to express their own views, will make every effort 
to distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture, and fact and will 
clearly entitle editorials and commentaries as such. 
Section 6 (False and Deceptive Material) 
6.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute material that 
they know or ought to know to be false or deceptive. 
6.2. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute material unless 
they have undertaken a prudent and reasonable inquiry to ensure the 
veracity of the material. 
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Section 7 (Right of Reply) 
7.1. Publishers will extend a right of reply when they have writt . d . en, 
pn~te .' p~blI~hed, or distributed content that places a person, group or 
~n mstr:utIOn m.an unfavourable light, if fairness and impartiality require 
It. PublIshers wIll ensure that the reply is given equal prominence to the 
unfavourable content. 
7.2. If printed, published or distributed content proves to be false 
publishers will print, publish and distribute a correction as soon a~ 
possi~le. Publishers will ensure that the correction is given equal 
prommence to the false content. 
153 
The catalo~ue of rules fo~~d in the normative base is gathered from a variety of 
sources. It mcludes prOVISIOns commonly found in domestic legal systems such 
as thos~ prohibiting advocacy of violence and protecting individual repu~ation 
and pnvacy, as well as prohibitions, such as those found in Section 2.2 and 
Reg~lation ~000/4, that are grounded in international conventions. 28,29 It might 
be v~ewed, m effect, as an incipient international, or extra-state, law of news 
medIa content regulation that embellishes norms found in existing international 
instruments. 30 
The SRSG and TMC made selective decisions as to the content of the 
nor~ative base, not merely absorbing into the module a set of rules from any 
partIcular legal system. It was important to the SRSG to claim that input was 
sought from local groups and foreign organizations during the drafting 
process. 3! 
Viewed in broad perspective, the key characteristic of the normative base is 
that it reflects the precarious and recurrent tension in human rights law 
between free expression guarantees and the validity of interferences with 
the right of free expression, especially where the countervailing interest is 
protection of individual right to physical security. Care should be taken to 
consider whether those elements that are contemplated as a surrogate Code of 
Conduct are of a different quality (from a free expression point of view) from 
those rules that are akin to domestic law. While the set of rules may find 
counterparts in domestic settings, many elements might conflict with various 
constitutional frameworks, such as that established by the First Amendment of 
the US Constitution. For the UNMIK authorities, the resolution of this 
tenSion. is ~ound in the emphasis on a particular vision of 'media responsibility', 
one whIch mcorporates, along with traditional aspects ofIegal regulation, major 
elements of professional journalistic ethics as well. This is in keeping with the 
Kosovo normative structure itself, which makes the Codes of Conduct legally 
binding and enforceable. 
The. emphasis on this vision of media responsibility was set forth by the 
TMC m a lengthy statement disseminated to the public on 9 March 2001 in 
which the TMC defended the imposition of monetary fines on two newspap~rs 
B S 32 , 
ota ot and Epoka eRe. The statement includes these excerpts: 
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[W]hat has resulted is a general misunderstanding of the substantive 
issues on which these cases were argued. The editors of the newspap~rs 
concerned are failing yet again in their principal duty, that of educatlllg 
and informing their readers [ ... ] Achieving the right bal~nc~ between 
freedom on the one hand and accountability on the other lS dlfficult: It 
may be a cliche, but does freedom of speech allow a per~on to yell fire III a 
crowded theatre? Most people would say that it doesn t and ~hey would 
acknowledge that there should be some sort of legal ~nd eth~cal f~ame­
work to deal with this delicate balance [ ... ] [A]s most )ournahst~ wlll tell 
you, the principles that uphold freedom of expres~i~n in inter~~tlOna~ law 
are laid out in the International Covenant on ClVll and pohttcal Rlghts 
and the European Convention on Human Rights. But, an~ as many 
conveniently forget, they also recognise that there are dutles and re-
sponsibilities that come along at the same time ... [Bota Sot and Ep~ka e 
Re] have shown a flagrant contempt for the basic tenets of professlOnal 
journalism and the duties and responsibilities th~t are attached to the 
right of freedom of expression. Publishers and edltors must understa~d 
that they are accountable both morally and in law for wha.t they pubhsh 
within the context of the society that they serve. Anarchy lS not free~om 
and freedom of speech does not mean a free for all. It must be exerclsed 
with care and account must be taken of its consequences. 
The scope of this vision of media responsibility has been broa~ened am~d the 
particular circumstances in Kosovo. I~ Bosnia and Herzegovllla, and III the 
period of regulation in Kosovo untll June 2000, :he focu~. was on ~e 
debilitating effect of hate speech on social and polittcal stablllty. Thus~ III 
February 2000, shortly after promulgation of the Hate Speech Regulatton, 
OSCE Head of Mission Daan Everts stated: 
We cannot tolerate hate speech anywhere in society - whether it is o.n t~e 
radio, in the classroom, in a newspaper or at a political ra~ly .. Whlch ~s 
why the issuing of the regulation on hate speech at t~e beglllnlllg of thlS 
month was so important. Most of all, the new regulation sh~uld .work as a 
deterrent. I raise this now because while the mechanisms wlll eXlst to pull 
the plug on a radio or TV station, the same cannot b~ done to. a 
newspaper. We have no plan to have a press law for prlllted med~a; 
in fact we are determined not to have such a law. It smacks of censo~shlp. 
But if a paper publishes vitriol and bile, which incite hatred a.galllst a 
community or group - as some Kosovo papers have done - th~re lS a ~egal 
route to take action against them. Anyone can lodge a com~lalllt .. It l~ up 
to the Court to decide whether the journalist, editor or pubhsher lS gmlty. 
. ·1 d 33 
And if they are they can be fined or )al e . 
As these remarks indicate, the international authorities were initial~y reluctant 
to take steps that went beyond sanctioning of hate speech to regulatlOn of other 
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content as well, to use law to promote a broader notion of media responsibility. 
Instead, as reflected in the comments of Daan Everts, hopes were placed on 
journalists' self-regulation: 
In any.case, we hope that we won't have to use the Hate Speech 
RegulatlOn. Instead we want to see self-regulation in Kosovo. Not 
self-censorship. But a mature look at what is published or broadcast 
and why. This is part of the role of a strong, democratic and independent 
media. Which is why we are pleased that all Kosovo's media have got 
together to form an Association. A central part of this Association is a 
Code of Conduct. Media outlets themselves will now be responsible to 
ensure that their professional colleagues and their rivals do not overstep 
the mark.34 
Howe~er, later, following the events surrounding the death ofPetar Topoljski, 
a Serblan UNMIK employee, in spring 2000, the SRSG's steps signalled a 
shift toward a more aggressive approach, abandoning media self-regulation and 
grounded in a public safety rationale. 35 As crafted in the context oflawlessness 
in Kosovo, this approach can be summarized to say: journalists have a 
responsibility, where a democratic state is not fully functioning and where 
violence is a regular means by which differences are resolved, not to infringe the 
physical rights of individuals or to increase social tension; where those duties 
are violated, the authority has the right to discipline. 
There is the interesting suggestion, here, that greater leeway is permitted to 
the TMC because it is not only 'law' in the traditional sense, but Codes of 
Conduct in the self-regulatory sense, that are at issue. If the TMC were acting 
as a self-generated watchdog of the press, with its powers arising from ethical 
rules established by the press, then the restrictions, possibly, could be greater 
than if they originated from the State (or, here, its international equivalent). 
But, in fact, though the TMC may consider itself the substitute code-carrier 
incarnate, it is so only because of the origins of power in government. 
The shift from hate speech to public safety as the core underlying public 
interest rationale is also significant. It shows that the normative base in the 
module can be flexible, lending itself to transfer to different post-conflict 
situations. The public safety rationale is grounded in the nature of the post-
conflict setting in Kosovo, in which the UN administration faced a vacuum in 
civil institution infrastructure, most significantly in judicial institutions, and a 
chaotic situation marked by widespread violence and considerable potential for 
I d .. I 36 h . pro onge ,on-golllg VlO ence. T us, it was concluded, strong measures were 
viewed as necessary for protection of individuals from violence due to the 
absence of domestic legal authority and the existence of, or potential for, 
widespread lawlessness. 37 
Because of this shift from hate speech to public safety, the normative base in 
Kosovo extends beyond requirements imposed on domestic legal regimes in 
states party to instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and 
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination.38,39,40 In other words, they go beyond the type of 
action that is required of states under international law, and rely on the type of 
action that is permissible under international law force. . 
The sum result of this dialectic this effort to balance rights of free expreSSIOn , . , 
and countervailing rights, is that the scope of the normative base in Kosovo .1S 
quite narrow. In the end, the vision of media responsibility articulated m 
Kosovo gives wide latitude to news reporting and commentary that does .not 
violate the public interest goals of protecting individuals an? grouFs agamst 
incitement to violence and expressions of hatred. Thus, the 1ssues m Kosovo 
are not those that typically give rise to the greatest concern among proponents 
of journalistic freedoms: the normative base does not equate pro:ection of t~e 
public interest with protection of state interests, or ~ith protectl~n of. publ~c 
figures or institutions from critical commentary or :v~th suppr~ssmg d1sse~1-
nation of facts unfavourable to the governing authontles. In th1S regard, wh1le 
the normative base does proscribe the dissemination of material which journal-
ists 'know or ought to know to be false or deceptive', it does not (in contrast to 
many domestic legal system~) dictate ~ore st~ing:~t penalties -",h.en the 
material is injurious to part1cular pubhc offic1als. Nor d~es 1t l?clude 
proscriptions against content found to be insulting to pubhc .affic1als or 
governmental entities.42 Instead, the primary goal ~f the n~rmat1ve base,. at 
least as applied in Kosovo thus far, has been to estabhsh the kmd of pr~tectlon 
against incitement to violence found permissible in many domest1c legal 
systems and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, as well 
as the hate speech proscriptions found in international instruments.43 
Implementation of the Module: Process and Accountability 
It is a truism that the test of a legal system's compliance with fundamental 
norms as well as fairness and effectiveness, lies in the actual application and 
enforc~ment of its laws. This is certainly the case with the module as well. 
Among the recurring themes in the studies appearing in this volume is not only 
the need to define substantive standards, but also the structural and procedural 
requirements satisfactory to establish legitimacy for information intervention. 
Of these, one of the most pressing is that of institutional and procedural 
safeguards against improper interference with the exercise of expressive 
activity. 
In a complex context, most of the individuals endowed with these powers of 
regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have acted, g~nerally, 
responsibly and have deliberately sought to maintain the balance mherent 
in the system of information intervention. At the same time, however, it must 
be recognized that the structure itself, if adopted in future situations, could 
lend itself to potential abuses. These are new phenomena - it is only very 
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recently that international actors have begun to by-pass domestic legal regimes 
as the intermediaries of application of international human rights norms in the 
field of mass media regulation. 44 And the systems of accountability are also new 
and, if review is by the secretary-general or the Security Council of awesome 
distance from the locales of post-conflict environments. That is 'a prominent 
reason for the existence and activity of 'freedom of speech' NGOs. 
How does one review implementation of the module, application of the 
normative base and the procedures that have thus far been developed in its 
evolution? As before, we are guided by applicable international standards and 
I . . I I 45 . genera pnnClp es of aw. A number of these have rece1ved articulation in 
Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights construing that provision.46 
To do this, we will focus first on what we have called, bringing together the 
existing examples, the office of the Regulator, particularly its prosecutorial 
functions. Then, we will turn to questions about the module's control 
mechanisms; in particular, looking at issues of competence and degree of 
structural independence. 
The Office of the Regulator: Public Relations, Investigation, 
Prosecution 
The multi-dimensional office of the Regulator includes both extra-legal and 
law-based functions. In other words, in some cases, it acts to advance certain 
policies by means of powers of persuasion, while in others - its more sensitive 
role - it acts to investigate and prosecute suspected violations of legal norms. 
The result is a combination of a managerial theory of compliance with 
traditional criminal law models of forcible enforcement. 47 
Within this range of activity, it is possible to delineate several elements of the 
performance of duties in this office: informal/public advocacy, investigative, 
and prosecutorial elements. Thus, in carrying out its functions, the Regulator 
acts as a public advocate for media responsibility, a monitor of mass media 
conduct and investigator of complaints, and as a formal prosecutor. 
Extra-Legal Functions 
In general, the manner in which these functions are carried out can be 
attributed to questions of individual personal style; the very human, personal, 
direct management of the operation. Models are abstract, impersonal, de-
scribed, usually, apart from the personnel who implement them. In the case of 
Kosovo, for example, the success and operation of the framework has been 
affected in important ways by the personal characteristics of the individual 
holding the office.48 
The hallmark of the extra-legal activity has been a frank can dour on the part 
of the Regulator, a readiness to articulate its motivations and its goals. Thus, 
the Regulator has been vocal in providing expressions of concern and pleas for 
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voluntary compliance with accepted journalistic ethics. The style is open, 
cajoling, and clearly conscious of the public effect of the TMC's pronounce-
ments. At times, these statements to the journalistic community and the public 
at large have taken on the character of general observations, perhaps warning 
about legal violations but without identifying specific offenders. For example, 
in a 20 February, 2001 news release about its sanctioning decision against the 
newspaper Epoka eRe, the TMC stated: 
The TMC remains deeply concerned about the current levels of in-
flammatory and potentially dangerous accusation and counter accusation 
in the Kosovo written press [ ... J Much of the press in Pristina serves up 
a daily diet of denouncement and insult. As a consequence the TMC 
considers that the flavour and tenor of the press at present contributes to 
h '1' h f . 49 t e preval mg atmosp ere 0 tenSIOn. 
Or, on other occasions, the TMC addressed concerns about individual news 
organs to the public and journalistic community with regard to conduct that, 
while considered irresponsible, was lacking in a legal basis to proceed to 
prosecution. An example is a TMC 26 March, 2001 news release, entitled 
'Altering Photographs', which we reproduce here in full: 
Last Friday the 23rd March 2001 all of the major newspapers in Kosovo 
carried the story of Thursday's tragic shootings at a Macedonian military 
checkpoint in Tetovo. These stories were all accompanied by photo-
graphs, most of which originated from the Reuters News Agency. With 
the exception of Bota Sot all these newspapers showed a black object on 
the ground close to the body of one of those who was killed. Indeed there 
has been considerable debate as to precisely what this object was. 
The Office of the TMC understands that the circumstances surround-
ing this incident have caused considerable controversy. In this respect it 
is not the intention of the Office to comment on these circumstances or on 
the editorial line taken by any of the newspapers in their Friday editions. 
However, what is extremely alarming is the apparent removal, by Bota 
Sot, of a crucial piece of evidence from a photograph taken from an 
international source. 
The Office of the TMC is currently in discussions with the Senior 
Legal Council of the Reuters News Agency to determine conclusively 
whether or not Bota Sot altered the original Reuters image to suit the 
thesis of their article. We have also consulted with them on how they may 
wish to proceed. Additionally, we are also corresponding with other 
international news and press agencies, including CNN and AP TN, and 
have discussed with them their footage and reports of the incident. All 
have confirmed the presence of the object in their respective photo-
graphic or video sequences and from the eye witness accounts of their 
journalists. 
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If it were indeed the case that Bota Sot did manipulate the images they 
obtained from Reuters, this would constitute gross professional mis-
conduct. Furthermore, their attempts to portray all the other media who 
carried these images, as being misleading would be a further example of 
deliberate distortion in the face of the overwhelming evidence. It is the 
duty of editors to report the facts as accurately as possible and to 
distinguish opinion from fact. This is particularly important when 
tensions are high and the subject matter is so sensitive. To alter the 
available evidence to support an opinion and pass it off as news is 
unconscionable and discredits the profession of journalism. 50 
In looking to future applications of the module, we note that the above 
examples present a fine line between the Regulator's legitimate use of powers 
of public persuasion and the exercise of a chilling effect on the exercise of rights 
of expression. The reason for this, of course, is that the Regulator's public 
statements are always backed by its power to influence media conduct by means 
of the threat inherent in its authority to prosecute. It will take strict adherence 
to the normative base, limiting such use of public relations to content falling 
clearly within its confines, to keep the Regulator from crossing the line into 
exerting a 'chilling effect' on protected news reporting and commentary. 
Legal: the Authority to Investigate and Prosecute 
The legal power of the Regulator lies here: in the authority to investigate 
suspected violations, to assess whether a violation has indeed occurred, and to 
proceed with the prosecution process, which can culminate in the imposition of 
sanctions. It is here where the most sensitive concerns about abuse of authority 
can be found. 
The Regulator's investigative activity serves multiple purposes: it provides 
the regulatory authority with information with which to establish guilt, as well 
as to identify ameliorating or exacerbating circumstances for the purposes of 
crafting remedies and/or penalties. Thus, in the Epoka e Re newspaper case, 
TMC Simon Haselock made an unannounced visit to the newspaper's offices 
(following an unsuccessful attempt to elicit information by mail from the 
newspaper), and in the Bota Sot case he engaged in extensive correspondence 
with the newspaper's editors. 51 ,52 
These activities present both positive and potentially negative aspects. They 
demonstrate a human touch, an opportunity for negotiation and mediation. On 
the other hand, they pose the spectre of the sort of arbitrary harassment that 
authorities in many countries have employed to threaten the mass media if their 
content is considered offensive. To guard against this risk, a crucial element 
will be the existence of effective independent review of the Regulator's actions. 
As we will discuss below, this is a weak link in the TMC system. 
Another dimension of the investigative mode provides the Regulator with the 
opportunity to construe and apply legal norms in deciding whether or not to 
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proceed with formal prosecution. An example is the TMC's 25 April, 2001 
letter to Mr Xhavit Haliti, demonstrating the TMC's will.ingness to constr~~ 
international human rights norms in applying the normatIve base mandate. 
Mr Haliti a leading figure in the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK), had 
asked the TMC to investigate the possibility of charges against the newspap~r 
Bota Sot. 54 We quote an excerpt from his letter at length because of what It 
reveals regarding the TMC's investigative and prosecutorial style: 
I have written to Bota Sot concerning your complaints and have 
discussed your concerns with them at length. Unfortunately, given 
the very specific nature of the Regulation I have to tell you that I do 
not consider that I can proceed on this matter any further. To be sure of a 
successful action under the Regulation all the various criteria that it 
stipulates must be satisfied and this is not possible in the articles to which 
you refer. Nevertheless, I must say that I consider these a~ticles to have 
been deliberately sensational, unsubstantiated and provocatIve and I have 
made these and other points forcefully to the Editor and will continue to 
do so. 
I also note from your letter that you understand the principle that as a 
public figure you will often be exposed to criticism and allegations. T?is 
is the one of the negative aspects of public political debate. In applYIng 
the conditions of the European Convention on Human Rights in regard 
to freedom of expression you will be aware that the European Court has 
taken the view that public figures are not entitled to the same measure of 
protection in cases of defamation than [sic] are private citizen.s. This is 
another reason why I believe that a case taken up on the basIs of your 
complaints would not stand scrutiny by the Media Appeals Board. 
This example serves as an illustration of TMC's efforts to operate within .the 
constraints oflaw, including the fundamental norms in the UNMIK constitu-
tional structure. 
Formal Prosecution 
In Kosovo, the prosecutorial energies of the TMC have been focused o~ cases 
involving suspected incitement of violence against individuals. At .tIme ?f 
writing, the TMC has invoked the formal sanctioning process three tImes, In 
actions against three different newspapers. 55 In each case, the charge was the 
same: violation of Section 4.1 of Regulation 2000/37. 
The Regulator is empowered to prosecute suspected violations of ~he 
normative base which is rendered enforceable by means of a range of remedIes, , . ' . . 56 
including financial penalties and suspensIOn or termInatIOn of operatIOns. 
The exercise of these powers implicates a number of general principles of law. 
First, according to those principles, the laws and process must be transparent 
and 'lawful' - that is, based on existing, published, generally applicable legal 
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norms generated by the legislature and not the executive branch. This means 
operating pursuant to generally applicable, published normative base. One 
measuring stick is to ascertain whether the norms in question have sufficient 
precision and clarity to satisfy the 'prescribed by law' requirement in Article 
10(2) of the ECHR. 57 
As implemented in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the module, with 
its published normative base, appears to satisfy these standards. For example, 
in those cases in Kosovo in which prosecution has been invoked, these 
conditions appear to have been satisfied. In this regard, it should be noted 
that despite his evident opposition to Bota Sot's alleged unprofessional conduct 
expressed in the 'Altering Photos' news release, TMC Simon Haselock did not 
pursue legal action against the newspaper. 58 
This contrasts with the action of the SRSG in June 2000, when it closed the 
office of the newspaper Dita for eight days on the grounds that Dita and its 
editors 'had violated the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 1244 
(1999),.59 The SRSG's action was taken in response to the events of spring 
2000, when Dita identified Topoljski, as mentioned, a Serbian UNMIK 
employee, as a war criminal and provided both a photo of Mr Topoljski 
and details of his name, address and workplace information. Topoljski was 
found murdered on 16 May, and on 19 May, the editor of Dita published an 
open letter to the SRSG, indicating that the newspaper would continue to 
publish the names of individuals 'involved against Albanians'. It is doubtful 
that SC Resolution 1244, which does not refer to expressive activity in any way 
and is not directed toward private actors, contains any language that would 
support the conclusion that closure of a newspaper for publication of detailed 
information about an individual, even if done so in order to advocate violence 
against that person, would satisfy the 'prescribed by law' standard.6o 
Other general principles relevant to the module relate to the process itself: 
an accused's right to be heard, equality before the law, and opportunity for 
appea1. 61 The TMC's mandate in Regulation 2000/37 provides little direction 
on the procedures to be followed by the TMC in determining the existence of a 
violation and imposing sanctions.62 However, the structure and process of 
prosecution have evolved quickly into a more formal set of legal rules and 
safeguards. In this regard, the important step was the MAB's decision in the 
Dita case, in which the MAB overturned the TMC's decision to impose 
sanctions on the newspaper because of procedural infirmities: violations of 
international norms and the law in effect in Kosovo in 1989.63 In response to 
that decision, the TMC adopted measures to provide greater procedural 
safeguards for accused. 64 According to the Media Hearings Board Rules of 
Procedure, if the TMC concludes that a violation has occurred and that 
prosecution is warranted, the formal process must begin with the TMC's 
presentation of written notice (which we will call an 'Accusation'), which must 
inform the alleged violator of an opportunity to reply.65 The indictment must 
then be presented to the MHB, which determines whether a violation has 
occurred and, in addition, recommends to the TMC whether there are any 
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mitigating or aggravating circumstances that should be taken into account when 
the TMC decides upon the appropriate remedies and/or penalties. 66 The TMC 
is not permitted to impose sanctions without a finding by the MHB that the 
media outlet or representative in question has violated one or more rules in the 
normative base. 67 
At the MHB hearing, both the TMC and the respondent, who may be 
represented by an attorney, are allowed to address the Board for no more than 
forty minutes, and each member of the Board may question the parties for up to 
thirty minutes. The Board may invite for oral presentation third-party wit-
nesses and experts; the Rules of Procedure do not provide the parties a right to 
question those persons.68 The burden of proof upon all such issues is upon the 
TMC. 69 The TMC's decision as to penalties may be appealed to the Media 
Appeals Board.7o The MAB is empowered to uphold, modify, or rescind the 
TMC's sanctioning decision. 
Throughout, questions of accountability and independence loom over this 
process. Is there sufficient sharing and diffusion of power to guard adequately 
against abuses by the authorities? Is the Regulator sufficiently independent 
from the legislator/executive SRSG? Is the Regulator accountable only to the 
law? By what mechanisms are the Regulator's acts reviewed to determine their 
compliance with these principles? 
Here, again, certain general principles (sensitive to the special needs of a 
post-conflict context) should apply. For example, a prosecutor is bound by law, 
and only the law (here, this means the fundamental norms in the UNMIK 
Constitution, as well as the normative base); a prosecutor must be independent 
from legislative and executive branch control; and, to insure observance of 
these standards, a prosecutor's act must be subject to review by an independent 
agency.71 The last point is perhaps the key to the entire system of adminis-
trative justice. In effect, it provides that there must - again subject to the 
possibly special circumstances of conflict zones - be a supervisory system of 
control sufficiently independent to make an objective determination as to 
whether the administrator has acted in compliance not only with other 
principles of administrative justice, but with all applicable legal norms as well. 
While clearly an effort to assure procedural fairness, the module's structure 
and procedures raise certain questions from the point of view of compatibility 
with these principles. First, there is the question of the TMC's independence 
from the SRSG, which is both the UNMIK legislature and executive. 
According to the TMC's organic statute, the TMC has independent status 
and is temporary pending the establishment of effective domestic parallel 
structures.72 The meaning of 'independence' in this context is not explained. 
The individual TMC is named by the SRSG; however, the SRSG is not 
involved in the day-to-day functions of the TMC, nor is there evidence that the 
SRSG has exerted any direct influence on the TMC's actions. 73 
Second, and perhaps more problematic, are a series of questions related to 
the roles of the TMC, the MHB, and the MAB. The MHB is analogous to a 
trial court, with the judge or jury making the ultimate determination of guilt or 
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innocence. However, this MHB decision is insulated from review. In addi( 
if a violation is found, it is the Regulator (the TMC) who decides on the na::;~ 
of the penalties - definitely a judicial or jury function that should be outside the 
Regu~ator's powers. ~y possessing the ability to decide upon and impose 
sanctIOns, the TMC IS both prosecutor and judge. 
Next, the question must be asked, although it is very difficult to answer 
w~et~er the MHB and MAB are sufficiently independent to satisfy general 
pnncIples and the UNMIK Constitution. In the context of ECHR Article 6.1, 
the ECtHR has construed 'independent' as independence from the legislative 
and executive branches, as well as the parties.74 The European Court's deter-
minations as to the independence of control bodies is very fact-intensive and 
given the scope of our inquiry, we can simply cite the factors listed by the Court; 
In order to determine whether a body can be considered to be 'in-
dependent' of the executive it is necessary to have regard to the manner of 
appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office the 
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the que~tion 
whether the body presents an appearance of independence?5 
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are three significant areas in which 
the Kosovo MAB lacks competence: (1) review of the Regulator's investigative 
acts; (2) review of the MHB's decisions as to guilt or innocence; and (3) review 
of the SRSG's legislative acts. 76,77,78 As to the last of these, this means that 
the MAB's competence also does not extend to a power of review over the 
normative base itself, to determine if its provisions comport with the funda-
mental norms of the UNMIK Constitution. 
In sum, significant steps in the evolution of the module have been taken to 
insure adequate safeguards for the mass media. However, particularly before 
the module is again employed in a post-conflict situation, attention should be 
devoted to further analysis and structural and procedural revisions. These 
matters go directly to fundamental issues about the module's legitimacy. 
The Quest for Legitimacy 
The emerging system of information intervention, reflected in the module, 
rests on a thin veneer of acceptance within the global community at large: the 
assumption, by the UN Security Council and secretary-general, that regulation 
of m~dia content is both acceptable and integral to democracy building in post-
conflIct societies, and that it is possible to conduct it in a way that is compatible 
with international free speech and free press standards.79 
The initial emergence of the module met with intense criticism from free 
press advocates.
8o 
The significance of this lies in the reminder to the United 
Nations and other international organizations that this system of governance at 
bottom is reliant upon a public legitimacy, difficult to obtain or sustain in light 
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of the perceived threat to news media freedoms. From a slightly different 
perspective, the concerns about legitimacy might also stem from a democratic 
deficit in international institutions. 
To address these concerns, it is necessary to have safeguards against heavy-
handedness, or even the appearance of such heavy-handedness, by assuring 
procedural fairness and objectivity. In this regard, in addition to noting the 
binding fundamental norms in the UNMIK Constitution, much of our 
discussion has been grounded in an assumption that certain general principles 
apply here as a matter oflaw. But even if they might not as a matter oflaw, they 
should be followed as a matter of policy, for the sake of establishing and 
maintaining legitimacy. 
Even more generally, the human rights rationale for what might be called 
'aggressive peacemaking' and the intrusiveness into the zone of freedom of 
expression is a precarious one. To achieve legitimacy, processes of information 
intervention need popular support from the very people and institutions from 
whom it faces determined opposition - media NGOs, especially free speech and 
free press advocates. A critical sticking point for these NGOs is the question of 
whether circumstances ever can exist to justify a rearticulation and reframing of 
widely accepted standards of free speech/free press. How norms are developed, 
their very entry and maturation, will have an influence on how they are received 
by these significant groups. The UN must find ways of engaging those who 
'vote' on the question of legitimacy. 
The development and presentation of free speech norms in the information 
intervention context is important for another reason. Peacekeeping operations 
are partly designed to provide a context sufficiently altered and enhanced that a 
more democratic society can flourish after the operation has been dissolved. 
Construction of a public sphere that supports a democratic society is an element 
of that process. When an international governmental organization engages in 
regulation of the press, its actions may affect the nature of the political system 
that follows. How a regulatory rule is shaped, how it is presented in the society, 
how those who will be subject to a seemingly censorial rule react and accept that 
rule - all these are part of the difficult process of democracy development in a 
conflict zone.81 
Conclusion 
The module is a work in progress, based on exigencies, which dictated not only 
its form and substance, but indeed its very rationale for existence. The post-
conflict intervention functions within the existing organizational structure of 
the United Nations and is intended to be a temporary system designed to 
respond to an environment of lawlessness and violence and the absence of 
effective domestic legal institutions. 
Two interlocking themes form the framework for understanding this 
normative base: the pervasive nature of human rights law, and the specific 
A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION 
post-conflict circumstances in Kosovo. Because they directly affect the exercise 
of free expression guaranteed in international human rights instruments, and 
because some of the normative base exceeds what is required of states to 
regulate hate speech under international norms, an over-riding question 
becomes whether the restrictions on media content are permissible inter-
ferences with media freedoms. 
These have always been complex issues in domestic legal systems. The 
emergence of the module now presents a new dimension for the study of these 
long-standing issues in the sphere of mass media law. 
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Notes 
1. This phrase is borrowed from Thompson and De Luce's contribution to this 
volume: Chapter 7: 'Escalating to Success? The Intervention in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina'. 
2. Contributions to this volume emphasize the distinctions between pre-, 
peacekeeping (,Phase One') and post-peacekeeping (,Phase Two') forms of in-
formation intervention. 
3. Thompson and De Luce. Chapter 7. 
4. The Office of the High Representative established the IMC on 11 June 1998, 
following the Conclusions of the 1997 Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 
that called for establishment of a temporary agency to monitor and supervize the 
mass media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Decision of the High Representative, 
'Decision on the Establishment [sic] of the Independent Media Commission', 
Sarajevo, 11 June 1998, Online Uune 2001] available at hup://www.OHR.INT/ 
mediares/d98061la. Pech, 'Is Dayton Falling?' p. 4. In March 2001 the IMC was 
merged with the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency to form a new entity, the 
Communication Regulatory Agency (CRA). The head of this new entity is the 
Chief Executive Officer. The module discussed in this chapter is based on the 
IMC before the merger. See OHR, 'Decision Combining the Competencies of the 
Independent Media Commission and the Telecommunications Agency' of 2 
March 2001. Online [October 2001], available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/ 
mediadec/default.asp?contentjd = 75. 
5. The TMC was created pursuant to regulations promulgated on 17 June 2000 by the 
Special Representative of the UN secretary-general in Kosovo: Regulation No. 
2000/36, 'On the Licensing and Regulation of the Broadcast Media in Kosovo', 
Online Uuly 2001] available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/ 
reg036.html and Regulation No. 2000/37, 'On the Conduct of the Print Media in 
Kosovo', Online Uuly 2001] available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/ 
regulations/reg037.html See Palmer, 'A Very Clear and Present Danger', p. 179. 
6. In March 2001, a new entity, the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA), was 
established in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a step in the transition toward local rule. 
The CRA's mandate includes assumption of the IMC's responsibilities. See the 
OHR, 'Decision Combining the Competencies of the Independent Media Com-
mission and the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency', 2 March 2001. In 
Kosovo, it can be expected that significant changes in the module will be 
forthcoming as a result of the 'Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government' signed into law by the SRSG on 15 May 2001 (UNMIK/REG/2001/ 
9), Online Uuly 2001] available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regula-
tions/regO 1.09 .html. Sections 5 .4(b) and 11.1 call for the establishment of a new 
media regulatory body, to be entitled the 'Independent Media Commission'. For 
the purposes of our contribution, we limit our description and analysis to the office 
of the Temporary Media Commissioner as of 15 May, 2001. 
7. See, e.g., Hansjorg Strohmeyer's recent proposal for 'quick-start packages' of 
existing structural and substantive law models for UN-administered territories, in 
Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction', p. 62. 
8. Matheson, 'United Nations Governance', p. 76; Wilde, 'From Bosnia to Kosovo', 
p.467. 
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9. The module's normative base is a substitution of international law for a domestic 
legal regime. However, in contrast to traditional international regulatory systems, 
the subjects of regulation are not states, but private natural and legal persons. As 
Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter put it, this idea of the supranational ~ 
fulfilled by the emerging module ~ 'represents another departure from the bedrock 
assumption of traditional public international law: that states, functioning as 
unitary entities, are the only subjects of international rules and institutions and 
hence the only recognized actors in the international realm'. Helfer and Slaughter, 
'Toward a Theory', p. 288. 
10. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999), Online Uune 2001], 
available at http://www.un.int/usa/sresI244.htm 
11. The organic acts for the TMC are UNMIK Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37; and 
the IMC's organic instrument is the 'Regulation for the Independent Media 
Commission (IMC)', adopted by the IMC on 16 September 1998 (amended 8 
September 1999, and 21 October 1999), Online Uuly 2001], available at http:;/ 
www.imcbih.org/Download/DLRegulations/DLReg/dlreg~2 
12. The secretary-general's periodic status reports to the Security Council concerning 
Kosovo include information on 'media affairs', available at the UNMIK website, 
http://www . un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo l.shtml 
13. UNMIK/REG/1999/1, 25 July 1999, Online Uune 2001] available at http:;/ 
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regl 
14. Article 10 ('Freedom of Expression') states in full: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsi-
bilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
Among the many secondary sources on the extensive Article 10 jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, see: Harris et a!., Law o/the European Convention, pp. 372-416; Van 
Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice, pp. 557~85; Krug and Swann, Supple-
ment to ABA-CEELI 
15. For the European Court of Human Rights' Judgements, see http://www.echr.-
coe.int 
16. See, e.g., decisions of the Media Appeals Board in the cases of: Belul Beqaj and 
the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, 
Respondent (16 September 2000), paras 68~75, Online Uuly 2001], available at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/indbodies/tmc/cases/dita.php3 and Sylejman Aliu and 
the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, 
Respondent (19 February 2001), paras 71~5 (copy on file with the authors). 
17. Reinisch, International Organizations, pp. 318~22. 
18. In referring to the SRSG, we incorporate those consultative institutions that 
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function within its Joint Interim Administrative Structure alAS), such as the 
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTS) and Interim Administrative Council (lAC). 
19. UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 ('On the Authority of the Interim Administration in 
Kosovo'), 25 July 1999, Section 1.1, states in full: 'All legislative and executive 
authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is 
vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General.' 
20. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar powers were conferred on the director-general. 
21. A similar list for broadcasters, but adding suspension or termination of broadcast 
licenses, is found in UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 3.1. 
22. 'Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure' (adopted 7 November 2000) Sections 
17-18. Online on the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Web site, http://www.osce.org/ 
kosovo. The three members (two local, one international) of the MHB are 
appointed by the TMC, based on nominations from three organizations: the 
Association of Kosovo Journalists (AKJ), the Kosovo Law Center, and the 
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (information in e-mail 
message from TMC Simon Haselock to the authors, 12 March 2001). 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a seven-member Enforcement Panel decides cases 
regarding the director-general's imposition of penalties, according to the Section 
16.1 of the 'IMC Procedure for Handling Cases' (adopted 8 December 1998, and 
amended 9 June 1999, and 21 October 1999), Online Uuly 2001], available at 
http://www.imcbih.org/Download/DLRegulations/DLReg/dlreg_3.html The de-
cision as to the penalty is also made by the Enforcement Panel. In Kosovo, this is 
made by the TMC alone. The Regulator in the Bosnia and Herzegovina system 
(the director-general) also serves as chair of the Enforcement Panel ('IMC 
Procedure for Handling Cases', Sections 13.1 and 15). Demonstrating somewhat 
greater sensitivity to separation of powers issues, the TMC in Kosovo is not a 
member of the MHB. In its 7 November 2000 news release announcing the 
issuance of the MHB Rules of Procedure and formation of the MHB, the TMC 
stated that the MHB would be an 'independent administrative panel'. Online 
Uune 2001], available, http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?newsjd= 1243 
In its 19 February 2001 Bota Sot decision, para 69, the Media Appeals Board 
repeated this statement. 
23. On 31 August 2000, the MAB adopted and issued two sets of procedural rules: 
'Rules of Procedure (Conduct of Hearings)' 001/2000, 31 August 2000. See OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo web site, http://www.osce.org/kosovoand 'Rules of Procedure 
(Filing of Appeals), Online Uune 2001], available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/ 
indbodies/mab. php3 
24. UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 4.5; UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, Section 
3.1. The MAB's three members (two international and one local) are appointed by 
the SRSG upon nomination by the Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Institution Building (UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 
4.4). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the IMC Council, the IMC's regulatory body, 
hears appeals from decisions of the director-general and Enforcement Panel ('IMC 
Procedure for Handling Cases' Sections 11.7, 16.5, and 23.1). 
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 15.1; ECHR, 
Article 7.1. In the area of freedom of expression, this principle is expressed in the 
requirement in Article 10.2, ECHR, that any interference with the exercise of 
freedom of expression must be 'prescribed by law'. 
A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION 
26. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, Section 1.1 ('Applicable Law'), states in full: 
The law applicable in Kosovo shall be: 
a. The regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder; and 
b. The law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989. In case of a conflict the 
regulations and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder shall take 'pre-
cedence. 
The date 22 March 1989 is the date on which the Republic Serbia Assembly 
formally terminated most elements of Kosovo's autonomous status. As of June 
2001, the TMC's publications and enforcement actions have never referred to 
any provisions from the legal base identified in Section l.l(b). 
27. See 'Temporary Code of Conduct for the Print Media in Kosovo' and the 'Code of 
Conduct for the Broadcast Media in Kosovo'. The codes were promulgated 
pursuant to SRSG Administrative Direction 2000/20 [UNMIK/DIR/2000/20] 
of 18 September 2000. The documents are online at the OSLE web site: http:// 
www.osce.org/kosovo 
28. Regulation 2000/37, Section 4.1; Code of Conduct Section 2.1. See, for example, 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969). 
29. These international conventions include: the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. 
30. Reflecting perhaps the challenging conditions in which such drafting takes place, 
certain provisions in the normative base are suspect on technical drafting grounds, 
perhaps under the 'prescribed by law' test of Article 10.2, ECHR. For example, 
Section 4.1 says nothing about the State of mind of the publisher (in contrast to the 
Brandenburg test's 'directed toward .. .'). In Section 2.1, the term 'other violence' 
is quite vague. 
31. See, for example, the speech by Ambassador Daan Everts, OSCE Head of 
Mission, on the occasion of the opening of the new studios of Radio Television 
Kosovo (RTK), 16 February 2000. Online at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo web 
site: http://www.osce.org/kosovo In response to critics of the Hate Speech 
Regulation, he comments: 
This new regulation has provoked strong reactions and some allegations that it is 
targeting the media specifically. This is not the case! The new regulation is 
absolutely in line with international covenants on freedom of speech and 
expression and it has been worked out after consultation with the Kosovo Joint 
Advisory Council of Legislative Matters, the Council of Europe and the UN. 
See also Section 1.1 of Regulation 2000/37, which states in full: 
The Temporary Media Commissioner, in special circumstances, may issue 
temporary Codes of Conduct. Before issuing any such code, the Temporary 
Media Commissioner shall consult with the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, and interested, media-related parties as appropriate. 
It is also possible that the SRSG vetted the proposed norms with consultative 
bodies such as the lAC and KTS. 
32. Copy on file with the authors. 
33. Everts, Speech on the occasion of the opening of the new RTK studios, 16 
February 2000. 
PETER KRUG AND MONROE E. PRICE 
34. Ibid. 
35. This more aggressive approach was without regard to distinctions between 
different forms of media (electronic or print). Despite protests to the contrary, 
one important consequence of this particular form of intervention is the elision of 
distinctions between the authority's treatment of broadcast media and its treat-
ment of print media. It is true that licensing existed only for broadcasters, but, as it 
turned out the burden of concern about violations that might upset the public, 
order dealt' with violations by the press. The authority to close down newspapers 
was actually used with newspapers, though not with radio and television st~tions. 
36. Ibid. and Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction', pp. 48-50, 58-60. It IS also 
important to note that much of the concern about violence stemmed from content 
in Kosovar publications that identified individual Kosovars, not members of other 
ethnic groups. For example, this was the case in the three formal prosecutions 
brought by the TMC. 
37. TMC's Simon Haselock has been a vocal proponent of this view. In his 20 
February 2001 sanctioning decision in Epoka eRe, for example, he stated: 
In my decision of 1 December against Bota Sot I explained why the conditions 
in Kosovo could not yet be described as approximating a fully functioning 
democracy. I went on to describe that violence remained a regular means by 
which differences were resolved and scores settled and that the fear of violence 
was self-evident across the whole spectrum of society ... [M]y main function in 
these cases is to uphold the rights of the individual against the threat of violence 
and increased tension caused by this irresponsibility. 'Sanctioning Decision on 
Epoka eRe', para. 8 Online at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo web site: http:// 
www.osce.orgjkosovo). 
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
Article III(c) states that '[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide' is one' 
of the acts that parties shall make punishable. Article V requires the parties 'to 
enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation 
to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention'. 
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976). Article 20.2 requires 
parties to prohibit by law '[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence'. 
40. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (1966). Article 4(a) requires parties to 'declare an offence punishable by law all 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial 
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any 
race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin'. 
41. 'Temporary Code of Conduct for the Print Media in Kosovo', Section 6.1. We do 
not wish to suggest that the normative base is free of problems. For example, we 
note that dissemination of 'false or deceptive' material in Section 6.1 is enforceable 
even without any need for the TMC to demonstrate that it was injurious to an 
individual. This is a significant departure from traditional notions of defamation 
law in domestic legal systems, which could potentially be applied to infringe 
seriously the exercise of expression. 
42. The absence of such provisions demonstrates the influence of the Lingens v. 
Austria, (1986) 8 EHRR 407, line of decisions by the ECtHR, in which the Court 
has ruled on numerous occasions that in public political debate, public officials are 
not entitled to the same measure of legal protection as are private citizens. See 
A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION 
171 
Harris.~t ai, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 397-401; and 
van DIJk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice, p. 572. 
43. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447, in which the United States 
Supreme Court stated that: 
[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a Stat t 
fi b'd . e 0 
or 1 or proSCrIbe advocacy of the use of force or oflaw violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action. 
Improvements to the normative base certainly can be made: while Section 2.1 of 
the print media Code of Conduct clearly seeks to replicate aspects of the 
Bran~enburg v. Ohio rule, it does not include the element that the advocacy in 
questIOn has been 'directed to' inciting or producing lawless action. This absence 
could expose speakers to prosecution under Section 2.1 even where they did not 
intend to 'produce' an actionable harm. 
44. The international community since 1945 has been creating norms; what is new 
here is that it is international agencies that are applying these norms. 
45. See, e.g., Council of Europe, The Administration and You; Amerasinghe, 'The 
Future ofInternational Administrative Law, p. 773; Price and Krug, The Enabling 
EnVironment for Free and Independent Media. 
46. A~ti~le 6.1 states 'I~ tiJe determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
crImmal charge agamst him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' A recent 
ECtHR judgement construing and applying this provision is Lauko v. Slovakia 
(unreported,2 September 1998), paras. 56-8. In our opinion, there is little doubt that 
the module's prosecutorial process presents a determination of a person's 'civil rights 
and obligations' or of 'criminal charges against him' and therefore implicates Article 
6.1. For one thing, it is likely that these proceedings would be viewed as 'criminal' in 
nature for purposes of Article 6.1. Here, of particular note are the facts that the SRSG 
Regulations are generally applicable and that the TMC identifies the purposes of its 
monetary sanctions as 'punitive' and 'deterrent' - factors that the ECtHR has found 
detenninative in concluding that Article 6.1 is implicated. Even if the TMC 
p.roceedings are not criminal in nature, it is likely that they would satisfy the 'civil 
rIghts and obligations' standard in Article 6.1. In its case law, the ECtHR has ruled 
tha~ administrative proceedings that may result in a negative impact on a person's 
busmess, property, or conduct of a profession will implicate Article 6.1. See Harris et 
aI., Law of the European Convention pp. 174--95. 
Meanwhile, it is important to note as well that the MAE itself has concluded that it 
is bound to observe the standards of Article 6.1. See the MAE's decision in Belul Beqaj 
and the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner OSCE 
Respondent, paras 62-7. ' , 
47. See Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, pp. 22-8. See also Helfer and 
Slaughter, 'Toward a Theory', p. 287. 
48. Much of the tone can be attributed to the approach of Simon Haselock who had , 
been an architect of information intervention in Bosnia Herzegovina and then 
became Temporary Media Commissioner in Kosovo in August 2000. 
49. TMC, 'Sanctioning Decision on Epoka eRe', para. 8. 
50. Office of Media Appeals Board, 'Altering Photographs'. Online at the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo website: http://www.osce.org/kosovo 
51. TMC, 'Sanctioning Decision on Epoka eRe', para. lO(a). 
PETER KRUG AND MONROE E. PRICE 
52. MAB decision in Sylejman Aliu and the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and 
Temporary Media Commission, OSCE, Respondent, paras 11-16. 
53. Copy on file with the authors. 
54. Regarding party affiliation, see: 'President, Kosovo Party Leader Discuss Mace-
donia Border Situation', BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 March 2001; and 
David Holley, 'Yugoslavia Power Changes Hands', Los Angeles Times, 7 October 
2000. 
55. The first case was the TMC's 20 July 2000 sanctioning decision against the 
newspaper Dita and its publisher, Belul Beqaj, in which a fine ofDEM 25,000 was 
imposed. This decision was appealed to the MAB, which reversed the TMC's 
decision on procedural grounds: Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and 
Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent. The second case involved the 
TMC's sanctioning decision of 1 December 2000 (following an MHB decision 
dated 13 November 2000) against the newspaper Bota Sot and its publisher, 
Sylejman Aliu, in which a fine of DEM 50,000 was imposed. This decision was 
appealed to the MAB, which in a 19 February 2001 decision upheld the TMC's 
action: Sylejman Aliu and the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and Temporary Media 
Commission, OSCE, Respondent. The third case was the TMC's 20 February 2000 
imposition of sanctions (following an MHB decision of 6 December 2000) 
amounting to DEM 5,000 (along with other remedies) against the newspaper 
Epoka eRe. Sanctioning Decision on Epoke eRe. Online at the OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo website:http://www.osce.org/kosovo. To our knowledge, that decision was 
not appealed. 
Each of the cases has had a different procedural history. In Dita, there was no 
MHB decision. In Bota Sot, there was both an MHB decision and an MAB 
decision. In Epoka eRe, there was an MHB decision, but apparently not an MAB 
decision. 
56. See, for example, Section 2.1 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, which authorizes 
the TMC to impose one or more of the following sanctions: a warning; the 
requirement to publish a reply, correction or apology; a fine of not less than DM 
1,000 and not exceeding DM 100,000; seizure of equipment and/or printed 
material; and suspension or closure of operations. 
57. For recent discussion, see the ECtHR decision in Tammer v. Estonia [Application 
no. 41205/98; Judgement of 6 February 2001], paras 35-8. 
58. 'Sanctioning Decision on Epoka eRe' (Note 58). 
59. Special Representative Executive Decision No. 2000/2 (UNMIK/ED/2000/2, 30 
May 2000), cited in the MAB decision in Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper Dita, 
Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent, para. 21. 
60. It is possible that Dita's acts might have been a violation of existing domestic law in 
effect at the time, but this was not the articulated basis for the SRSG's action. 
61. The equality before the law standard requires that in addition to the right to be 
heard, that the defendant be placed on an equal footing with the accuser in the 
process. See Council of Europe, The Administration and You, pp. 14-16. 
62. MAB decision in Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and Temporary 
Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent, para. 65. 
63. Ibid., para. 89. 
64. Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure (Note 24). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
of particular importance for procedural considerations is the IMC document 
entitled 'Procedure for Handling Cases' (adopted 8 December 1998, and amended 
A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION 
173 
9 June 1999 and 21 October 1999), Online Uune 2001], available at http:// 
www.imcbih.org/Download/DLRegulations/DLReg/dlreg_3.htmI 
65. SRSG Reg. 2000/37, Section 2.3. 
66. Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure, Section 15 (Note 24). 
67. Ibid., Sections 17 (,Absent fraud or intentional malfeasance, the decision of the 
Board is deemed final and not subject to appeal. Both the TMC and the 
respondent are bound to the decision.') and 18 ('In [the] event that the ruling 
favors the respondent, the respondent shall be protected against double-jeopardy, 
and the TMC shall drop all related complaints stemming from the original 
complaint. '). 
68. Ibid., Sections 6, 8, and 11-12. 
69. Ibid., Section 7. 
70. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Enforcement Panel will rule on both the questions 
of liability and the nature of sanctions if the defendant is guilty. These decisions 
may be appealed to the IMC Council. 'Regulation for the Independent Media 
Commission (IMC)' (adopted 16 September 1998, amended 8 September and 21 
October 1999), Section 16. Available at http://www.imcbih.org 
71. Council of Europe, The Administration and You, pp. 37--43. 
72. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/36, Section 1.1. 
73. Ibid., Section 1.2. 
74. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention, p. 231. 
75. Judgement in Lauko v. Slovakia, para. 63 (Note 49). See also the discussions of the 
Court's Article 6.1. case law on this question in Harris et aI., pp. 231--4; and van 
Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice, pp. 451-2. 
76. According UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 4.2(c), the MAB's power of 
review is limited to sanctioning decisions of the TMC; in other words, acts of the 
TMC after the end of the investigation and the MHB hearing. Thus, arbitrary use 
of the powers of pre-hearing investigation, such as unreasonable searches, are 
insulated from any review. This is because the MHB is also not competent to rule 
on these questions, but is limited to deciding the question of the accused's guilt or 
innocence and making recommendations as to mitigating or aggravating circum-
stances. 'Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure' (adopted 7 November 2000), 
Section 15. Online on the OSCE Mission in Kosovo website, http://www.osce.org/ 
kosovo/ 
77. The MAB's review power does not appear to extend to decisions of the MHB as to 
guilt or innocence. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 4.2(c) [MAB's 
review limited to 'sanctions imposed by the Temporary Media Commissioner']; 
and 'Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure' (adopted 7 November 2000), 
Section 17 [decisions of the MHB are not normally subjecno appeal]. It is possible 
that the question of Section 4.2(c) reflects simply a failure to revise UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/36 following the November 2000 creation of the MHB. However, 
Section 17 is quite explicit. 
78. The MAB, upon reviewing Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37, has concluded that it 
is not competent to review acts of the SRSG. See Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper 
Dita, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent, paras 
54-6; Sylejman Aliu and the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and Temporary Media 
Commission, OSCE, Respondent, para. 64. 
79. 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo', S/1999/779 (12 July 1999), Online Uune 2001], available at 
174 PETER KRUG AND MONROE E. PRICE 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm paras. S2-3 include the 
following: 
UNMIK has the unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundation for demo-
cratic and professional media in Kosovo . . . UNMIK will support the 
emergence of independent media and will monitor compliance with inter-
national media standards. The Special Representative will appoint a media 
regulatory commission to manage the frequency spectrum, establish broadcast 
and press codes of conduct, and issue licences ... In facing the challenge of 
fostering the development of independent media in Kosovo, UNMIK will 
promote a media culture based on democratic principles. 
SO. See detailed reports in the contributions of Thompson and De Luce, and of 
Thompson and Mertus to this volume (Chapters 7 and 9). The New York Times 
disparagingly characterized the module as an 'international media ministry' in 
'Kosovo's Incipient Media Ministry' (30 August 1999). 
S1. On at least one occasion, acts taken in operation of the module have had an impact 
outside the post-conflict zone. In April 2001, a news distributor in Switzerland, 
fearing violation of that country's anti-racism laws, decided to discontinue 
distribution of the newspaper Bota Sot. Reportedly, the decision was taken 
following the TMC's denunciation of Bota Sot for published statements regarding 
the tense situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See 'Switzer-
land: Albanian Paper Banned from Sale for Inciting Ethnic Hatred,' BBC 
Monitoring World Media Service, 10 April 2001. 
